REPORTING ON VIOLENCE
James Mercy, senior researcher in the division of violence prevention at the National Center for Injury Prevention and Control, of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. At the time of the quote, Mercy was acting director of the division. Don Colburn and Abigail Trafford, "Guns at Home: Doctors Target Growing Epidemic of Violence," The Washington Post Health Section. 12 October 1993.
Eric Gorovitz, legal director, Trauma Foundation, San Francisco, California. "California Dreamin': The Myth of State Preemption of Local Firearm Regulation." University of San Francisco Law Review 30, no. 2 (Winter 1996).
In the United States in 1993, out of 26,009 homicides, 71 percent were firearm-related.
In California in 1994, of the 3,699 homicides, 76 percent (2,778) were committed with firearms.
In the United States in 1994, there were 39,720 deaths due to firearms and 42,170 deaths due to motor vehicle injuries.
In California in 1995, 4,792 people died of gunshots, more than died in motor-vehicle related deaths (4,502). As of 1994, California is one of 10 states, including the District of Columbia, where firearm deaths have surpassed motor vehicle fatalities.
In the United States in 1994, 39,720 Americans were killed with firearms. Of those, 51.7 percent (20,540) were suicides; 43.3 percent (17,190) were homicides; and 380 were undetermined.
In the United States in November 1996, there were 131,132 federal firearm licenses, down from a high of 283,000 in 1993, when 74 percent of the licensees ran their businesses out of their homes. As a result of an increase of fees from $30 for a three-year license to $200, plus a $90 renewal charge, a requirement to submit fingerprints, photographs, and proof of compliance with state and local gun laws that may require licensees to install security systems and lighting, the numbers of licensees operating out of their homes dropped substantially. As of September 1996, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms has not repeated the 1993 survey that identified the number of businesses operating out of homes.
In California on October 4, 1996, there were 10,008 firearm licenses.
Handguns accounted for 89 percent (468/524) of firearm homicides and 71 percent (124/175) of firearm suicides from 1990 through 1994 in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Inexpensive (retail price less than $60), short-barreled .25-caliber handguns, known as Saturday night specials, were the most common weapon associated with firearm homicides and suicides.
Homes with guns are nearly three times more likely to experience homicide1 and five times more likely to experience suicide2 than homes without guns.
1Kellermann AL, Rivara
FP, Rushforth NB, Banton JG, Reay DT et al. "Gun Ownership as a Risk Factor for
Homicide in the Home." New England Journal of Medicine 329 (1993): 1,084-91.
Dr. Arthur L. Kellermann, director of
The Center for Injury Control, Emory University, 404-727-9977
2Kellermann AL, Rivara FP,
Rushforth NB, Somes G, Reay D, Francisco J. "Suicide in the Home in Relation to Gun
Ownership." New England Journal of Medicine 327 (1992): 467.
Dr. Arthur L. Kellermann, director of
The Center for Injury Control, Emory University, 404-727-9977
The rate of suicide among 15- to 24-year-olds is 27 percent lower in populations that have fewer guns due to more restrictive gun control laws.
In a study comparing gun deaths in Seattle, Washington with Vancouver, British Columbia, which has restrictive handgun regulations, researchers found that there was a 4.8-fold higher risk of being killed by a handgun in Seattle, while nonfirearm homicides were substantially the same in both cities.
In a 1991 study evaluating the immediate effect of Washington, D.C.'s, law banning the purchase, sale, transfer or possession of handguns by civilians, researchers found an immediate association between passage of the gun law and an abrupt decline in homicides and suicides by firearms. Homicides by firearms dropped by 3.3 per month, or 25 percent (the mean number of gun-related homicides was 13 per month, which dropped to a mean of 9.7 per month after the law was implemented). Suicides by firearms dropped by 23 percent, from a mean of 2.6 per month to 2.0 per month. Homicides and suicides committed by means other than firearms showed no reduction (which would have suggested some other factor was responsible for the decline) or increase (which would have suggested that other weapons were being substituted for firearms).
If there is no change in the trends established over the 10 years ending in 1993, by the year 2000 firearms will have far outdistanced motor vehicles as the nation's leading cause of traumatic death. From 1993 through the end of the year 2000, an estimated 350,000 people will be shot and killed in the United States. Nearly one-third of these will be teenagers and young adults ages 15 to 24. There are an estimated 7.5 nonfatal firearm injuries for each firearm fatality. By this estimate, the years 1993 to 2000 will also see 2.7 million nonfatal firearm injuries.
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms agents in Los Angeles found that the main sources of 1,764 handguns used in crimes in Southern California in 1994 were kitchen table gun dealers (those who sell out of their homes), corrupt commercial dealers, unlicensed street dealers, burglaries of gun stores, out-of-state purchases and second party or straw buyers.
In California, eight of the 10 brands of handguns most frequently confiscated in a criminal context by a law enforcement agency were the cheap, easily concealed, poorly made handguns known as Saturday night specials; all eight came from one of five Southern California manufacturers. Of the seven pistols most frequently traced by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF) in 1995, six were inexpensive guns from one of these Southern California manufacturers (unpublished data, BATF, 1996). After the estimated number of each manufacturer's firearms in circulation was controlled for, guns from these companies were 3.4 times as likely as those from other major manufacturers to appear in BATF's tracing data.
Injuries due to firearms, most involving handguns, are a major cause of morbidity and mortality in U.S. urban areas. The incidence varies greatly from city to city. In a study of three cities - Memphis, Tennessee; Galveston, Texas; and Seattle, Washington - 1,915 cases of injury due to firearms were identified between November 16, 1992 and May 15, 1994. The crude rate of firearm injury per 100,000 person-years was 222.6 in Memphis, 143.6 in Galveston and 54.1 in Seattle. About 88 percent of the injuries were incurred during confirmed or probable assaults, 7 percent during suicide and 4 percent were unintentional. Handguns were used in 88 percent of the cases in which the type of firearm was recorded. Five percent of the 1,677 victims who were brought to a hospital emergency room died, 53 percent were hospitalized and 42 percent were treated and released. Emergency department and inpatient charges exceeded $16.5 million in the three cities.
Eric Gorovitz
Legal Director
Trauma Foundation
San Francisco General Hospital
Building 1, Room 300
1001 Portrero Avenue
San Francisco, CA 94110
415-285-1793
e-mail: ericg@tf.org
Trauma Foundation
Case study information derived from interviews with Eric Gorovitz, West Hollywood council member Abbe Land and from "California Dreamin': The Myth of State Preemption of Local Firearm Regulation," by Eric Gorovitz, published in the University of San Francisco Law Review, Winter 1996.
West Hollywood, a small community in Southern California with a population of 30,000 and an area of 1.9 square miles, has a long history of supporting gun control initiatives. In January 1996, its city council proposed banning the sale of handguns known as Saturday night specials in the city of West Hollywood. Council members believed that enough data were available to demonstrate that Saturday night specials were disproportionately involved in firearm violence and thus were a threat to public health. The ordinance was passed with little opposition in May 1996 and went into effect in July 1996.
West Hollywood is under no illusions that its ban alone will prevent many deaths or injuries due to the proliferation of handguns. But the council saw its action - based on months of research to write an effective ordinance and months of legal research to support the ability of local cities to ban handguns - as a way to encourage the other 88 municipalities in Los Angeles County to follow suit. The movement is taking hold vigorously. So far, the city of Compton has also passed an ordinance banning handguns and the city of Los Angeles banned Saturday night specials with a unanimous city council vote. West Hollywood's action also inspired 16 contiguous communities in the San Francisco Bay area in Northern California to ban Saturday night specials. All but three of those bans went into effect in early 1997, with a goal of creating a regional solution to a regional problem.
Local communities have had to take the initiative because bills banning Saturday night specials have not passed the state legislature, despite public opinion polls that show that citizens of California want to eliminate the sale of Saturday night specials in their communities. A 1993 public opinion survey of Californians done by EDK and Associates and paid for by The California Wellness Foundation found that people view controlling the sale of handguns (42 percent) as much more effective than building more jails (19 percent) for reducing violence. (Violence Prevention in California: A Qualitative and Quantitative Study of Californians' Attitudes Towards Violence Prevention. July 1993.)
Local communities can be more responsive to their citizens than the state legislature. However, they must also be more wary of lawsuits by organizations which oppose their actions. West Hollywood felt it was on strong ground, for two reasons.
First, the council worked with a firearms and ammunition design expert and former member of the National Rifle Association who believes that Saturday night specials are useless, dangerous weapons. He developed a definition of Saturday night specials that would prevent gun manufacturers from making small changes in handguns just to circumvent the ordinance. The same expert drew up a list of handguns currently on the market that would fall under the ban, and this list was sent to manufacturers who could appeal the listings. The manufacturers have reviewed the list, and some have made appeals.
Second, the council had access to the same legal resources available to the gun lobby. Public health attorney Eric Gorovitz published legal research that showed that state preemption of local firearm regulation did not include banning the sale of a narrowly defined class of handguns. Gorovitz, legal director for the Trauma Foundation in San Francisco and chair of the local ordinance committee of the Legal Community Against Violence, consulted with West Hollywood's city attorney, who became comfortable with the prospect of defending the city's action in court.
The city has had to do so. A lawsuit has been filed against West Hollywood by the National Rifle Association and the California Rifle and Pistol Association. At this writing, the case was won by West Hollywood, and the National Rifle Association is appealing the ruling.
Local communities actually have very little local data to support their actions. They have national data and state data, but much information that would help local communities make better decisions on protecting the public health of its citizens is not available. They need answers to questions such as: What kind of gun? Who manufactured the gun? In the violent incident, who owned the gun? How did people using the gun get access to the gun? How much did it cost? How was the gun stored? What is its life history?
The state of California prohibits local communities from requiring local gun dealers to keep records of some of this information, and police departments ask none of these questions in assault cases and few such questions in homicide cases. Thus, local communities have taken a step that is becoming more common in a public health approach to preventing violence, similar to other major public health campaigns such as those to reduce deaths and injuries from automobile crashes and tobacco use. They say that the data gathered so far are good enough because the problem is so costly to individuals, families, communities and society.